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Domestic actors – Consensus and engagement

Relations with civil society have improved significantly. A more open style of consultation would increase the quality of public debate.

The development landscape in Spain is vibrant and features a great diversity of players. Spain is lucky to be on the top of international tables for public support to the cause of development.1 Since 2004, the SECI has re-established a consultative approach to policy making with representatives from civil society and sub-national levels of administration. Prior to this, relations between NGOs and the government had been tense, culminating in the walkout from the Development Council of some of the most well-known NGOs in 2001.2Now, there is broad consultation with civil society, both for strategic documents such as the Master Plan and sector strategies, as well as for country-level planning. The quality, transparency and inclusiveness of these processes could be enhanced, however. Observers of Spanish civil society have pointed out that this more consultative approach and the openness to NGOs has served as a cooption strategy, and that many critical voices have held back from outright opposition. Furthermore, there is an inherent conflict of interest in the treatment of Spanish NGOs as the extended arm of the Spanish cooperation and one of its main organizations for implementation, whilst also being critical observers.3

The following paragraphs will cover five main policy changes that have been implemented over the last few years: the restoration of the Development Council as the main consultative body, the establishment of a new contractual relation with large NGO allowing them more strategic and independent action, the regulation of the status of development workers, a renewed relationship with decentralised cooperation, and a new policy style to engage with domestic actors.

The restoration of the Development Council: The Development Council [Consejo de cooperacion] was established in 1995 after the ‘0.7-percent’ mobilisation of Spanish civil society, and has been enshrined as part of the system by the 1998 law on International Development. It is an assembly of government, academic and civil society actors, the latter comprising NGOs, private business and trade union representatives. The government is represented through all its departments relevant to aid and development policies, including Foreign Affairs, Economy, Home affairs (Migration), Agriculture, Defence, Education and Environment. In 2001, an amendment excluded the National Coordination body of NGOs (CONGDE) from naming more than two NGO representatives, whereas the remaining four were named by the government. This, along with a secretive approach to policy development, resulted in an outright confrontation between government on the one hand and civil society and academics on the other. Since this nadir, criticism of the way the relationship is now managed has been low-key, with most representatives satisfied with the significant increase in access and interaction. One of the first actions the SECI took in 2004 was to reform the Council, extending its membership from 25 to 33, appointing CONGDE, once again, as the delegated body for Development NGO members, and amplifying its mandate. The main addendum to the mandate tasked the Council with an annual report on policy coherence, to be submitted to the Parliamentary Commission on Development and providing information about the fulfilment of international commitments towards development, though without specifying the way this should be done.4 In the years since then, the Council has become a valuable part of the Spanish system, forming technical working groups on various matters, issuing statements on the planning process and working on policy coherence. Given these indisputable advances, the full potential of the Council is still largely underused. This will be discussed below.

Establishment of a new contractual relation with large NGO: The relation with NGOs, in their role as service providers, has been restructured by the new framework agreements [convenios]. Whereas NGO managers used to complain that most of their time was taken up with detailed account justification to AECI, the new legal model seeks to move towards result-based orientation and impact measurement. It replaces yearly funding by a multi-annual programming framework. With its accreditation procedure, AECI has set standards for transparency and professional non-profit management, going far beyond some of the other accreditation processes (see below). Unfortunately, these practices apply to large NGOs only. A huge number of the more than 1,200 NGOs registered with AECI are not called upon to meet these standards.5

The most important novelty of the regulation is the following: to access the framework agreement, NGOs have to be accredited by a process that looks into their normative framework as well as their managerial capacities and project management procedures, such as evaluation practices. 6 As of 2007, 25 NGO have qualified for general tasks and 13 for sector tasks. There is no periodic reassessment foreseen, and the criteria on which AECI can submit NGOs for reassessment are a bit obscure. Sources at the SECI expect that the number of accredited NGOs will not increase any further, given that other NGOs do not fulfil the managerial requirements for accreditation. Funding from the AECI has thus been concentrated. This is reflected in the following chart:

 

NGO funding by AECI
2002 Projects 62 17.641.218,80 €
  Programmes 4 10.800.794 €
2003 Projects 63 16.773.521,22 €
2004 Projects 80 20.925.033,06 €
  Programmes 23 109.649.398,50 €
2005 Projects 173 49.598.053,99 €
2006 Projects 144 31.160.590,37 €
  Convenios 101 249.507.090,84 €
Source: AECI 2007

It is unfortunate that within this regulation the commitment to aid harmonisation has not been reflected, and that a strategic debate on the added value of NGOs within the new “post-Paris” aid architecture has not been held. On the other hand, in the absence of a revised programme management and evaluation methodology, this new framework uses obsolete implementation and justification techniques which fit more with projects than programmes. In other words, it focuses more on activities and accomplishment of plans than on a more comprehensive learning process aimed at generating better outputs and outcomes from Spanish development cooperation. 7

The sector has been shaken by scandals lately. A number of NGOs have been investigated for embezzlement of funds. 8 Another debate has focused on mechanisms of voluntary accreditation. Fundación Lealtad administers one of these mechanisms and publishes an annual report, laying out criteria of transparent non-profit management. Some larger NGOs did not fulfil the criteria laid down by the organization.9 Meanwhile, others argued that the criteria applied by this organization did not cover actual activities, but remained at the procedural level of headquarters. 10 The CONGDE has reacted to these events with a statement, in which it mentions the rather toothless code of conduct and the shift from charity-based “angels” to professional entities moving within a political context. Unfortunately, it does not provide any policy recommendations for the sector’s self-regulation, and remains vague over what NGO “should do”. 11 The CONGDE itself contributes to transparency by neatly compiling all the activities of its members in a descriptive report. But as opposed to accreditation by Fundación Lealtad or the AECI, there is no methodological reflection on how to ensure integrity and improve the added value of NGOs. 12

The regulation of the status of development workers: The development law of 1998 stipulated that the status of development workers, particularly their social security coverage, would have to be regulated. Until 2004 this had not been done, and it was finally amended in 2005. There were some criticisms. One focused on the independence of humanitarian workers when they are covered by the Spanish state. Another concern referred to a large number of AECI staff who are not covered. By and large, however, this law was perceived as a long overdue reform, and was welcomed by the community of development and humanitarian NGO. 13

Renewed relation with decentralised cooperation: A particular feature of the Spanish development cooperation system is the variety of organizations involved. Most notably, so-called decentralised cooperation – official development aid implemented by sub-national bodies, the Comunidades Autonomas, like Andalucia, Catalunya or Valencia, and municipalities.14 These bodies raise and implement roughly 16 percent of all ODA, large portions of which are distributed via NGOs. The central government has taken a series of initiatives to improve coordination with decentralised cooperation. This is not always a simple task as Comunidades Autonomas (CCAA) might be ruled by opposition parties, or – given the aspiration for greater self-determination amongst some of them – try to compensate for their lack of a foreign policy mandate by engaging in international cooperation. Also, sub-national organizations tend to idealize the charitable aspects of development cooperation and, as international cooperation is very soft politics in the decentralised system, look primarily for the “photo”. As some (local) NGOs depend entirely on a single funding source, the space for discussion and criticism is very limited. 15

Notwithstanding, some CCAA have increased their planning and management capacities by setting up agencies or other managerial entities. Issues of coordination are supposed to be dealt with in the Interregional Commission for Development.16 Their proceedings are not accessible, nor is there a published strategy. Lately, a number of framework agreements between the SECI and CCAA have been signed.

Decentralised cooperation claims to have the advantage of being closer to the people, enabling it to foster public support for investing public funds in cooperation. There are also some particular development strategies that might be better targeted from a decentralised source, such as co-development [co-desarrollo], or support for decentralization processes or municipal administration in partner countries. These benefits, however, have to be measured against the fact that CCAA agencies add to the fragmentation of development cooperation, and thus to the administrative burden of partner countries. It is not clear how this particular feature of the Spanish system will integrate into the Paris Declaration commitments. The SECI, and the DGPOLDE in particular, has worked on system integration. The Plan Actual 2006 – guideline I. – has made coordination between actors an objective, and has formulated ambitious goals for better coordination. The Plan 2007 is committed to harmonising the evaluation practices of central government and decentralised bodies. One concrete coordination mechanism is the ‘programa municipia’, which aims to coordinate and streamline inter-municipal cooperation and institutional-capacity building at the first level of government. Although these commitments are at the cutting edge for achieving more coordination within the system, no results have been published yet.

New policy style to engage with domestic players: Various declarations have repeated that development policy has become a centrepiece of public policy under this government. Consensus between political parties and with civil society was sought, both in development of the Master Plan and sector strategies, as well as in partner countries with the Spanish NGOs on the ground. Whilst this is true, SECI’s policy making could still be more open. Consultations over sector strategies still involve only some specially invited organizations. The new consultation body for Africa policy is a noteworthy step forward, although neither the government nor participating organizations made big efforts to clarify the role of this body or communicate its proceedings to a wider public. 17 This broadly matches the actual preparation of the Africa Plan: the claim that is was “based on wide consultation” was perceived as outright fiction by large parts of civil society.

The publication of strategies during the drafting period – for example, as green papers – is not a common practice. In contrast, policies such as the multilateral strategy, or reforms such as that of the AECI, remain hidden from any kind of public scrutiny. Some of this clandestine behaviour might be because the administration is unable to deliver by its deadline. But a more convincing explanation is that the traditional policy style of ‘hide what you do’ is still in place. A particular illustration is the downright disinformation of the Parliamentary Commission on both the multilateral strategy, and any plan concerning the agency’s reform.

There are a number of examples both in style and technology that could be taken as an inspiration for more fluid relations with domestic players – in short, a new style of open government. Some development cooperation agencies, namely the British but also the European Commission, have learnt to make use of the rich expertise of development NGOs and academics.18 Governments were thus exposed to some bitter criticism, but the quality of policy making improved. So did the quality of criticism when former radical opponents got involved in highly technical issues and built up their analytical capacities, with the result that they now often serve as sparring partners before policy is finalized.

The existing structures in Spain could be used to this end. The Council could serve as a wider consultation body, and would thus become a showcase for Spanish development policy. In practical terms, this would require an independent secretariat for the council. A recent Intermón report calls for a more systematic use of the Development Commission in Parliament for debate, fed by reports and involving civil society groups.19 Action to raise the public profile of these bodies and make them accessible to content-based NGOs could maintain high public support for development policies, as well as add more technical content and evidence to government declarations. To that end, E-government technology could be a major boost. In short: Say what you do!