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Humanitarian Aid

Although funding has increased, institutional structure awaits reform. No comprehensive strategy aimed at achieving better quality in humanitarian action has been presented. A clearer separation between humanitarian and political objectives and players is required.

Humanitarian Aid has long been an orphan of Spanish Cooperation. In terms of funding, the Master Plan 05-08 is committed to successive increases in humanitarian aid, reaching 7 % of humanitarian aid to all bilateral aid in 2008. In 2005, there was in fact an increase in humanitarian funding from an average of around 3 percent in earlier years to nearly 4.5 percent. This is partly due to the natural disasters that have taken place in 2005. The main change has been an increase in the share managed by the Humanitarian Department in the Cabinet of AECI, a jump from an average 8 to 12 percent in earlier years to 34 percent in 2005.1 In the multilateral funding terms, Spain has been in both 2006 and 2007 amongst the top ten donors for funding to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund. Similarly, humanitarian funds managed by UNICEF and FAO were supported. 2

In terms of strategy, Humanitarian Aid appears in the Master Plan 05-08 as the seventh strategic priority, dubbed “Conflict Prevention and Peace Building”, which is somewhat misplaced in that it suggests a mixing of the – political – interest in pacifying countries by building institutions with the – apolitical, humanitarian – objective of saving lives. However, the current government seems to be far more careful in its separation of foreign policy goals from humanitarian intervention, and its protection of the humanitarian space. The Master Plan explicitly mentions the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination, and the Annual Plan 2007 refers to the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. There has been significant arm-twisting around civil-military relations in humanitarian crises. On the one hand, the Law for National Defence was passed, with the military claiming major responsibilities for humanitarian activities3: the armed forces have even been accused of portraying themselves as an souped-up NGO in publicity campaigns. On the other hand, the Council for Development Cooperation debated the issue, and although current regulations covering the armed forces were not directly mentioned, a comprehensive framework derived from international agreements and binding codes of conduct was assembled in the expectation that it be used to demarcate leadership, responsibilities and fund allocations during a future humanitarian intervention.4 On the positive side – although this is again only a statement of intent – willingness to become a partner in international quality assurance mechanisms for Humanitarian Aid is expressed in the Annual Plan 2007.

The Master Plan also promised to carry out a fundamental review of Humanitarian Aid planning instruments. However, the foreseen Humanitarian Sector Strategy and the establishment of an independent office for Humanitarian Aid within AECI have not yet been completed as of July 2007. Humanitarian activities seem somewhat out of place in the planning exercise of the Country Strategy Papers (DEP). They have been identified as a priority only for some countries (Honduras, Senegal, Philippines y Dominican Republic). There is no explicit section within the DEP classification for humanitarian engagements, and the very nature of this kind of aid means it cannot be subsumed within these planning cycles. Spain’s humanitarian policy awaits a conceptual, institutional, and procedural disconnection from the development wing.
The dynamics in the funding and management of humanitarian aid have been evaluated in more detail by other sources. The most important amongst these are IECAH, INTERMON and HEGOA, in close cooperation with a number of humanitarian NGO. 5