english | castellano

Planning

A comprehensive set of planning tools has been developed. Greater transparency in goals has been achieved, and should be followed by improving delivery structures and evaluation practices.

Replacing the rather arbitrary planning tools of the period before, DGPOLDE has engaged in the breakneck production of multilevel planning instruments. Although similar documents existed before, the DGPOLDE has devised a new methodology, and has set new standards for the way it was created. These are the main documents:1

  • The Master Plan, requested by the Cooperation Law of 1998, shall be the basis for a four-year planning period. The Master Plan 2005-08 is the second of its kind. 2
  • The Master Plan is to be specified in sector strategies, some of them cross-cutting and mainstreaming.
  • Annual Plans (PACI) specify the yearly action, and define measurable objectives. These Plans have been given thematic focus by the new administration. The PACIs are being reported on by follow-up reports (PACIseg).
  • Country strategy papers for priority countries: Documento de Estrategia País (DEP). For special attention countries: Plan de Actuación Especial (PAE).
  • Operational Plans define the action taken on policy formulation and planning.

The Master Plan is rather declaratory in nature, no budgetary allocations are indicated, and no measurable objectives or indicators are defined. Some critics argued that, when given the choice between accommodating further proposals from civil society in the consultation process and deciding on priorities, the drafters preferred to add to the bulk of statements, thus generating a “shopping list”. Hence the document is an agreeable guide to the international consensus on development, and a welcome statement on poverty reduction and multilateralism. It is not, however, a document which states measurable commitments, and could be used to hold the administration to account. Additionally there seems to be some confusion between “sectors priorities” and “horizontal priorities,” in that large parts overlap and are not given specific targets. Overall, there is a lack of clear operational options.

Regarding the country strategies, the Development Council has published a statement welcoming the new methodologies, and adding some critical appraisal.3 Briefly, its position is as follows. First, CSPs have been drafted before sector strategies, which might create a distortion of the CSP once these latter have been defined. Secondly, as the CSPs do not settle matters of operational planning, these have been delegated to a further operational plan per country, which could potentially be linked to the general annual plan (PACI). The linkage needs to be clarified. Third, before ever reaching the operative level, one has to pass through four or five levels of planning documents. This seems complicated. Fourth, a planning cycle of four years is legally prescribed. The workload on the administration to redo all documents every four years is high, which could potentially rebound on the quality of both process and product. Fifth, wide consultations were held in order to prepare these documents. The Councils mentions that the process was rushed, and that consultations could have been more extensive. Similarly, the depth of consultation with actors of recipient countries was very diverse. The government does not use online consultations. Therefore, the consultations – and the different opinions they produced – remain largely undocumented. In other development cooperation agencies, it is increasingly common to publish strategy papers as green papers, and ask for comments over a three-month period. Sixth, the sector planning within the preparation of the CSPs could have been an opportunity to focus, set clear-cut priorities, and limit the intervention sectors. This opportunity has not been taken. In most CSPs, a large number of sectors is mentioned.

Accordingly, a cross-analysis of the CSPs shows there is no common pattern either in the number of intervention sectors in each country, nor in the number of stated priorities. The table below shows this, taking three examples:

CSP Country
Forecasts
Priority Sectors
(Number of accomplished Strategic Objectives)
  Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4 Total number of sectors
Guatemala 5 5 3 4 17
Ecuador 3 - - - 3
Mozambique 2 4 4 1 11
Source: Nils-Sjard Schulz: Division of labour among European donors: Allotting the pie or committing to effectiveness? FRIDE Comment March 2007;

Additionally, no allocation of funds for each of the sectors is provided, which might otherwise have helped establish an order of priorities. The methodology for the preparation of CSPs does not request that any of the following be provided: (1) a definition of what is meant (financially, institutionally, operationally, etc.) by the priority levels, (2) a connection of objectives with instruments, (3) the relation of the stated objectives to allocated funds and, (4) guidelines on how many sectors shall be covered, and at which priority level.

Another big challenge is reconciling the country planning process with the commitments of the Paris Agenda. Although the tool for the planning process requests consideration of the objectives of local ownership, alignment and harmonization, no country-based measurement for ‘complying with Paris’ is established. Similarly, no connection of the Spanish contribution to results-measurement frameworks is specified. The whole planning process still pays little attention to the Spanish contribution to fulfilment of the Paris Declaration indicators. Given that the CSPs do not tackle operational planning, this might then be the job of the operative programming documents. The expectation is that these issues are being addressed in the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” announced in the seventh guideline of the Annual Plan 2007.4

This planning process has created a heavy workload in AECI and OTCs, with considerable external support from consultants. While great efforts have been devoted to this task, the institutional capacities for ensuring the monitoring and evaluation of the plans are not yet defined, neither at headquarters nor at country level.

In terms of delivering on promises, as of June 2007 it has to be said that the announced sector strategies have not yet been published. SECI justifies the delay by pointing to the extensive consultation processes.5 Together with those relating to the strategies for economic development and humanitarian aid, the strategies that should cut across sectors – such as conflict prevention, multilateralism, governance – are eagerly awaited. These latter will face a particularly difficult task, since all cross-cutting strategies necessarily have to touch upon the flawed institutional system and coordination mechanisms of the Spanish Development cooperation System. All of these strategies will most likely request an opening of the compartmentalised management structure, both within the agency and within ministries.

There is no doubt that the SECI has proposed a set of planning tools and methodologies that not only communicate accessibly the aims of Spanish development cooperation, but force particular aims to be defined and set into the context of the overall policy of poverty reduction. There are some outstanding tasks, though:

  • The main criticism is that the first generation of some of these documents, mainly the DEPs, have remained rather declaratory, rather than operational. The DEP do not stipulate that aid instruments must reach the defined objectives. It is important to understand that the DEPs are mainly geared towards coordinating domestic Spanish actors in the partner country, rather than specifying budget allocations or preparing an intergovernmental dialogue.
  • Another bottleneck is the lack of a review of the evaluation methodology so as to take on board the comprehensive development framework established by the Paris declaration – the insertion of any cooperation into national development policies and impact measurement frameworks. Definition of objectives and indicators in DEPs should be based on this link in the chain.
  • Moreover, the translation of planning into action is heavily dependent on institutions. How software (the plan) and hardware (the machine for implementation) interact is not always taken into account. The critical observer could get the impression of an underlying assumption that implementing bodies could be remote-controlled from the DGPOLDE by feeding them plans.

One has to acknowledge the difficulties in presenting strategies before the implementation structure, most notably the role of AECI, is fully defined. Without the structure (reform of the agency) and the methodology to ensure feedback (evaluation), planning remains fragile.

All the above comments, however, are only possible because the SECI has committed to specify the rules of the game for its planning process. It is to be expected, under the vigilance of the Development Council, the Parliamentary Commission for Development and not least civil society in partner countries, that second-generation country strategies will build on experiences gathered from the first, rather rushed, round of planning. Then, the missing pieces in the puzzle can be inserted. 6

  • 1 All planning documents are available at the MAEC SECI DGPOLDE website; since 2006 the PAE have a foreword which explains the planning levels.
  • 2 The first one, 2000-2004, has been heavily criticised for its non-consultative nature, after the SECI refused to adopt a proposition developed by some of the leading Spanish academics in development policy.
  • 3 See the Development Council 2006: Expresión de opinión del Consejo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo sobre el proceso de planificación de la cooperación española, julio 2006.
  • 4 Indicators: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/60/36080258.pdf; see the website on monitoring the Paris Declaration: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring; see the World Bank country reports on Indicator 1 and 11; World Bank Aid Effectiveness Review. The fulfilment of ‘Paris’ gets even more important as recent communications within the development community call for assessments of “good donor behaviour”, see for example the Note by the UN Secretary-General on Coherence, Coordination and Cooperation in the context of the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus; E/2007/10 (19 March 2007) (accessible in documents.un.org/)
  • 5 In the Commission For Development from 19 April 2007.
  • 6 The elaboration of the DEP of Bolivia has been documented, recounting the experiences from the country office and the coordination body of Spanish NGOs in Bolivia. See the Chapter ‘El Proceso Participativo en la elaboración del Documento Estrategia-País en Bolivia’ en: Plataforma 2015 y mas: Los objetivos del Milenio: Movilización Social y Cambio de Políticas. Madrid. It gives an overview of the shortcomings and potentials of the planning process. It is noteworthy that the process limits coordination to coordination between Spanish actors, without relating extensively to other donors and national policies. Compare this with the Aid Effectiveness Profile for Bolivia drafted by the World Bank.